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See More. Another possible source of information about encampment locations west of the Schuylkill was Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg. General Knox, whose second choice was hutting thirty miles west of Philadelphia, attributed mention of a position in that area to him.
Although Muhlenberg now resided in Virginia and commanded Virginia troops, he grew up in Trappe, about seven miles north of Valley Forge. Muhlenberg may have been pumped for information, but he did not recommend an encampment in that vicinity when Washington called for written responses. At first he gave no thought to his home territory as possible quarters; in his report of December 1, , he favored quartering in Wilmington. In his second, of December 4, he altered his view to suggest either Wilmington or hutting twenty miles west of Philadelphia.
Unlike Stirling, Wayne mentioned no particular locality, such as Radnor or Tredyffrin. He did not specify the criterion that was so important to Stirling and to Irvine-that the encampment be west of the Schuylkill.
Stirling and Irvine were primarily concerned with strategic and logistic considerations in recommending the hutting alternative. Irvine does not appear very anxious for the eastern part of his native state to be vigorously defended by major operations. He humbly noted to Washington that he was inexperienced in war, but his suggestion in this instance seems to reflect solid military thinking, based on careful appraisal of the needs of the army.
Stirling, although from New Jersey, did not show concern about how his plan would affect British operations there. From west of the Schuylkill, Washington could march back to northern New Jersey and New York, if necessary, but southern New Jersey could not in any case be defended. His main argument for the plan was its strategic location. In support of it he wrote. Despite the substantial arguments for this alternative, the other generals were lukewarm or cool toward it.
It is possible that Washington, the two major generals who also ignored these proposals, and several others of the Council of War did not fully comprehend what was being suggested. Four generalsMajor General John Sullivan, and Brigadier Generals Smallwood, Maxwell, and Muhlenberg — gave indication that they understood this alternative, but several others apparently did not.
Stirling was an impetuous general, often too eager to attack, so his colleagues may have believed that this third alternative meant not going into winter quarters at all, but essentially remaining ready for combat. Even though Stirling and Irvine clearly stated that the army should retire a safe distance from the field of conflict, Brigadier General George Weedon thought the proposal was for hutting ten to fifteen miles from the city for offensive purposes, and Brigadier General John Cadwalader understood it to be for hutting in the field of operations.
Whatever the generals comprehended about the plan, they undoubtedly understood its principal and most controversial feature: hutting in the wilderness. Washington, and the large majority of generals who favored the other two proposals, anticipated quartering the men, at least in some large proportion, in permanent structures that provided good shelter.
The Stirling and Irvine proposals called for the men to live entirely in huts made of logs, branches, and thatch. Washington never declared himself on using huts, but his concern about the lack of good housing in an unsettled area can be deduced from his statements. He wrote only of the town cantonments, at Wilmington or Lancaster-Reading, as alternatives. On announcing the move to winter quarters, December 17, he made special effort to reassure the troops that they would be warm and dry in huts at the encampment, and that he would share their suffering though not in a hut, it turned out.
Generals Sullivan and Smallwood claimed that huts were unhealthy. Lafayette objected to any location other than a settled area. The only sites eligible for consideration by the commander and most of his advisors were those offering a substantial number of permanent shelters. Hutting was, however, by no means out of the question for a number of subordinate generals. The reasons were that Wilmington was a small town-of 1,, inhabitants-and the towns in the Pennsylvania backcountry were crowded with refugees from Philadelphia and other eastern districts.
These included Congress, now having taken refuge in York, and the Pennsylvania state government, ensconced in Lancaster. The plan for cantonment at Lancaster and Reading was always spoken of as quartering the army in and between the two towns in available buildings or, if necessary, in huts.
In debating the relative merits of quartering in Wilmington versus cantonment at Lancaster and Reading, the generals emphasized the disadvantage of having to build huts to supplement permanent shelter in both of these locations.
They did not agree on which of the two would require the most hutting. General Wayne warned that the Lancaster-Reading position had cover for only one-third of the army. Even though he thought Wilmington afforded more permanent shelters, Wayne acknowledged that some hutting would be necessary there as well. Advocates of the Lancaster-Reading cantonment could not claim that Wilmington would require more hutting than their choice.
There was no absolute difference in quality of shelter among the alternatives; none possessed ideal housing conditions. The availability of permanent structures was one of several imperfect circumstances to be considered in picking winter quarters, not a sine qua non.
Washington, in selecting the location for cantonment, could easily have decided, as he had numerous times before, that the view receiving the largest number of votes from his generals should prevail. The lack of consensus in this instance probably surprised and certainly disturbed the commander-in-chief.
This proposal received a plurality of nine votes, two more than did Wilmington. Three of the six major generals favored it. Possibly Washington was influenced by three of the four Virginia generals who voted for it. It appeared at first to offer more comfort for the troops, which for Washington, by all indications, was a major concern. Of the nine generals who favored the alternative most remote from Philadelphia, four stated that the army needed a lengthy rest and a resupply interval away from the British.
The commander-in-chief was in a difficult quandary. Washington hoped that Reed, his former secretary and adjutant, and now Pennsylvania delegate to Congress, could advise him more sagaciously than had his generals about where to canton the troops.
He must have been disappointed when Reed turned out to be of little assistance directly. His former aide advocated scattering troops throughout southeastern Pennsylvania — from Wilmington to Downingtown, with a few west of the Schuylkill and the militia east to the Delaware. Although Reed did not suggest anything practical, at least he helped lead Washington toward eliminating one alternative-cantonment in the Reading-Lancaster area. The two objections were, first, that Lancaster and Reading were greatly overpopulated with refugees from eastern Pennsylvania, and second, that the troops would be too distant from Philadelphia and too scattered to protect the eastern part of Pennsylvania from British foragers.
Armstrong at first favored a Wilmington-Downingtown cantonment, as did Reed, but in a few days, on December 4, he changed his mind and advised hutting in the field, as Cadwalader also advocated.
Congress appointed a committee that arrived at Whitemarsh on December 3, while Washington and his generals were discussing the site for winter quarters.
Congress and the committee agreed with the Pennsylvania government that eastern Pennsylvania should not be left uncovered. Without doubt Washington was under considerable political pressure not to quarter the troops in Lancaster and Reading. The Army seems to have a peculiar Claim to the Exertions of the Gentlemen of this State to make its present situation as convenient as possible as it was greatly owing to their Apprehensions and Anxieties expressed in a Memorial to Congress that the present position was had.
In actuality, Washington revised the history of this Pennsylvania memorial to Congress to support his request for further material support from the state for the troops at Valley Forge. He had already decided on the site for winter quarters when the memorial reached Congress on December 17, the same day that the army set out for Valley Forge.
The memorial called on the army to remain in the field to fight a winter campaign, not quarter twenty miles away; it was bluster, not strategy. Quartering soldiers in the same towns that were already overflowing with displaced Pennsylvanians would make everyone miserable. Many troops would be in crude huts, and all would compete with civilians for scarce space and resources.
Stirling argued that if the troops were to be cantoned far from Philadelphia, they would be more comfortable in deserted towns in New Jersey.
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